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Resumo
Nesta dissertação, propõe-se um novo modelo capaz de tratar o problema de leilões
com opções de compra. Este formato de leilão tem vindo a tornar-se cada vez mais
popular em websites de leilões, mas toda a literatura sobre este tema é reduzida e
bastante recente.
Com recurso à teoria das opções reais, o problema das opções de compra perma-
nentes é abordado e um modelo capaz de determinar o ponto de decisão óptimo é
proposto. Os resultados do modelo permitem ao agente decidir se deve colocar mais
licitações ou se deve optar por exercer a opção e comprar o bem imediatamente,
utilizando apenas parâmetros de calibração de expectaticas e o preço de exercício
da opção.
Habitualmente, em websites de leilões, existem vários leilões disponíveis para bens
semelhantes. Num segundo modelo (baseado no modelo inicialmente apresentado),
aborda-se o problema considerando a existência de leilões sequenciais, determinando
a estratégia óptima em cada um dos leilões considerados. Para ambos os modelos
são apresentados exemplos numéricos, bem como uma representação dos efeitos de
revisões de expectativas nos resultados obtidos.
Palavras-Chave: Leilões, Opções Reais, Buy-it-Now
Códigos de Classificação JEL: D11, D44, D81
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Abstract
This dissertation proposes a new model for auctions with buy-out options. This
type of auction has become a common practice in major auction websites, but all
the literature about this subject is scarce and fairly recent. By using real options
theory, the problem of permanent buy-out options is addressed and a model capable
of retrieving the optimal timing to buy-out is proposed. The model results allow
the agent to decide whether to bid in the auction or to buy the item through the
buy-out option using only expectation parameters and the buy-out price.
Usually, in auction websites, there are multiple auctions for similar items. A second
model (based on the first presented model) accounts for the sequential auctions sce-
nario, granting the optimal strategies for each auction considered. For both models,
a numerical example is presented, as well as the effects of expectation reviewing on
the results.
Keywords: Auctions, Real Options, Buy-it-Now
JEL Classification Codes: D11, D44, D81
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Chapter I
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Auctions have become a popular means for buying items in the past decades since
the arrival of online auction platforms in the 90s. Auction theory itself has been
around for much longer, but the current auction formats are a bit different from the
traditional ones. In fact, since the appearance of auction sites like eBay or Yahoo,
auctions were opened to wider ranges of bidders and adapted to fit the needs of such
large demand.
It’s a new reality, constantly growing and changing. It is also important to note
that in the US, the online auction market changed recently since eBay practically
has no competition. In 2007 Yahoo closed the auction website after giving up on
other countries as well, now operating only in Japan, Taiwan and Hong-Kong.
Today one can access eBay (or any similar website) and practically buy anything,
and can do so without even leaving home. While the traditional idea of auctions
associates with high value items or collection pieces and small audiences, today we
see auctions for virtually every kind of item, available to any interested customer.
With the changes in the auction setup it’s natural that some new auction concepts
and rules arise, evolving from traditional auction formats. Longer durations (usually
several days), proxy bidding systems1, unknown reserve prices2, and many other
rules have been adopted by online auction websites. All of them are introducing
new variables into the auction game, and changing the outcomes of their traditional
versions. One particular example is the Buy-it-Now clause from eBay or from Yahoo,
where the bidders have also the chance to buy the item at a fixed price if they don’t
want to participate anymore in the auction. Since 2000, buy-out options started
appearing in online auction sites and spread to sites like uBid, Bid or Buy, eBay
1A bidder tells the auction website the absolute maximum that he is ever willing to bid for
an item. Then, website places a bid on his behalf and continues to bid on his behalf whenever
he is outbid by another member’s bid, until the maximum is exceeded or the auction is won
(www.ebay.about.com).
2A reserve price is an optional feature used by sellers to allow them to void the results of
an auction if bidding does not reach their desired price. Buyers can, however, identify reserve
price auctions by the presence of “Reserve not met” (or “Reserve met”) in the auction information,
indicating that a reserve price has been set and it has not (or has) been exceeded by bidding
(www.ebay.about.com).
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or Yahoo (Mathews, 2003). Each website names it differently, but since we will be
studying the option’s concept and not a specific website’s ruled option, we will call
it “buy-out option”, “Buy-it-Now” or simply “BiN”.
This rule can be set by the seller in the beginning of the auction and can, itself, have
different forms. One can set a temporary Buy-it-Now and make it disappear once
the first bid is made, or once a price (unknown to the bidders) is reached (Gallien
and Gupta, 2007). There is also the possibility of preserving the Buy-it-Now option
throughout the entire auction, making it a permanent type of buy-out option.
What impact can a rule like this have on the outcome of the auction? First of all,
it would depend on the rest of the auction rules. But in a second price auction,
where usually the bidder with higher valuation3 wins the item (Ausubel, 2003), the
Buy-it-Now opens the possibility for any other bidder to buy the item and end the
auction before any competitor can even start bidding. This changes the outcome
completely.
Since the environment in which these auctions happen is virtual, no one knows how
many competitors there are, who are they, what are their valuations of the item,
or even the time when the bids are going to be placed. It’s a dynamic interaction
without information about the opponents where the player4 must decide whether to
keep bidding or to step out of the auction, exercising the option to buy it now.
The decision taken at an individual level leads to another question: How does one
decide to bid or to buy? And, in some cases, when to do it? Is there an optimal
moment to step out of the auction and buy the item?
This is the main goal of this work, to determine the optimal decision of the agent.
We propose to achieve a result that can help a bidder decide whether to bid or to
buy the item, and to provide a way to know when to do it.
1.2 Previous Research on Auctions with Buy-Out
As stated before, auction theory has been a part of Game Theory for a long time.
Early papers about it (Friedman, 1956; Vickrey, 1961), showed interest in exploring
the bidding process using game theory, and studying the implications of different
auction layouts (comparing first price with second-price auctions).
3Valuation is the value that the item holds for the agent.
4“Bidder”, “Agent” or “Player” will be used to refer to the economic agent in our model who is
facing the decision to bid or to buy-out.
2
Vickrey (1961) managed to determine the Nash equilibrium for the dutch auction
game (treated as a first-price sealed auction). In the homogenous case with risk
neutrality, and by assuming that every competitor’s value for the object is derived
from a probability distribution, and by knowing his own valuation, the agent would
set his bid. In the end, all the bids would be compared and the one with the
highest bid would wind the item. The problem was deciding the amount that the
agent should bid in order to maximize his gains. The conclusion was that bidding
bi =
N−1
N
vi, i ∈ {1, N} was the unique equilibrium strategy for every participant
i with valuation vi. This showed that the auction was inefficient, encouraging the
bidders to bid lower than their valuations.
Most auction models relied on this perspective of translating the auction into a
game and finding the Nash Equilibrium. With the introduction of buy-out options,
this approach has not been the most successful, resulting in the need to find new
solutions.
Even though auction theory has been around for half a century, most research on
buy-out is fairly recent, with no more than 10 years.
One of the first works on this matter was presented by Budish and Takeyama (2001).
The apparently irrational behaviour of using a buy-price when there was an auction
at lower bids was their main concern. They prove that for eliminating the risk
associated with the auction, the seller extracts a premium from the buyer through
the buy-out price.
Since it’s been published, many researchers started to approach BiN related prob-
lems. Hasker and Sickles (2010) covers the theory present in the auction marketplace
and some research and models about these phenomena. Most, however, focus on
aspects such as credibility of buyers or effects of starting prices in seller’s revenue,
resulting in many empirical studies about correlation between these variables. Still,
there are some who try to study the buyer-seller interaction and propose models.
Hidvégi et al. (2006) addressed the bidder’s optimal strategy and achieved an equilib-
rium based on von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and definition of several
classes of bidders and different degrees of risk-aversion. By focusing on the expected
social welfare from the English auction with buy-out option, they also compared the
temporary and permanent versions of the options. Reynolds and Wooders (2009)
also define threshold equilibrium strategies for bidders for temporary and permanent
buy-out options, focusing on the effects on seller revenue and the choice between
these two types of option.
Both Hidvégi et al. (2006); Reynolds and Wooders (2009) present equilibria, but
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none of the two define the threshold as a function of auction’s parameters. There
have been very few attempts to do so, Chen et al. (2011) do it but with focus on the
effect of the buy-out price choice for the seller. They present an optimal strategy for
the bidder depending on it’s risk-aversion with focus on the seller’s optimal decision
when setting the buy-out price. Finally, an empirical study to test their conclusions
is also presented.
References to a premium for eliminating risk (as if it was a hedging strategy) suggests
that auction theory has started to link with some financial concepts in order to solve
this problem. But we intend to take it even further and treat the Buy-it-Now as the
option it really is.
1.3 The Approach Proposed in this Dissertation
Previous work on this matter lacked buy-out analysis from the perspective of the
buyer and the choice between bidding and buying. None of the previous authors
approached the problem as a real option, and that’s what we propose to do. We
intend to study the permanent BiN option’s effects on bidding behaviour, to face
both alternatives and determine which one is better, essentially to help the player
to choose between them.
The problem at hand can be treated as an option. At every moment the bidder
has the chance to keep bidding or to step out and exercise the option to buy the
item paying the buy-out price. As shown later on, by using real option theory we
determine the optimal moment when the buy-out option should be exercised. It will
work much like in the case of a real option, where a threshold is achieved and acts
as a trigger for implementing the project (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Most papers so far focused on Game Theory to solve the problem, but we propose
a different approach. One that allows us to model buyer behaviour and at the same
time step away from utility functions and social welfare and focus on bidder/buyer’s
decision based on variables that he can access and control.
Reynolds and Wooders (2009) propose cutoff strategies of bidders to compare Yahoo
and eBay temporary and permanent BiN, from the perspective of the seller. Hidvégi
et al. (2006) determine a few thresholds for several types of bidders, considering risk
aversion and utility functions.
We propose a model that can be used by any potential agent, when a single auction
with a BiN clause (for a single item) is available.
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In addition, we also propose a model for the sequential auction problem with sub-
stitute items: the choice between auctions when trying to buy a single item, with a
series of similar and sequential auctions to chose from. The sequential auction prob-
lem has been the topic of some research papers, but with different goals than what
this dissertation proposes. Zeithammer (2004) recognizes the connection between
sequential auctions for similar goods and Zeithammer (2006) studies its efficiency
as a trading mechanism. Juda and Parkes (2009) also address the sequential auc-
tion problem, but with intent to improve the proxy bidding system used by eBay.
Finally, Said (2011) proposes a stochastic approach to the problem of randomly
arriving bidders in sequential auctions.
The model that we propose for sequential auctions focuses on the choice between
bidding or buying while introducing compound options, as a consequence of sequen-
tial auctions.
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Chapter II
The Models
1.1 The Model Setup
Consider the following scenario as a representation of the problem that we address
in this work:
A potential buyer searches auction websites hoping to find the item he seeks. He
comes across an auction with a permanent buy-out option for a single unit of the
item he wanted.
The following rules apply to this auction:
• Bids are placed through a proxy bidding system, using an online platform.
Meaning that the buyer needs only to set his maximum bid and let the software
place bids for him until the price limit is reached. The proxy bidding system
will make sure to bid high enough to cover any competing bids below the
imposed limit. In the end, the winning bidder will pay the price of the second-
highest bid plus a minimum increment.
• The current winning bid’s value is shown to every participant.
• There is no unknown reserve price, meaning that there is no price threshold
for the item to be sold.
• Whenever a bid is placed, the auction’s duration is increased. The auction does
not have a hard closing time, meaning that the option’s maturity is undefined,
but exists.
• There is a permanent option to end the auction and buy the item at a previ-
ously set price.
So far, the auction at hand can be classified as a second price English auction, where
current bids are public (“open-outcry” auction). There is, however, a tweak in the
bidding system. As stated, bids will be placed through a proxy bidding system,
an automatic bidding program that will try to replicate the bidder’s behaviour
according to the given maximum bid.
Let the following example show how this bidding system works:
6
Example
Bidders A and B are competing in the auction. The current price is e 5 and
bidder A decides to set e 10 as his maximum bid, while bidder B currently
leads the auction having set before a maximum bid of e 8. Until bidder A made
his move, bidder B had the highest bid around (e 8) but the current price was
only e 5, just enough to beat all competitors. Since bidder A decided to enter
e 10 as his maximum bid, the proxy bidding system will compare both bids and
return the outcome as if it were an second-price auction. Imagine an iteration
with each agent bidding the minimum increment to beat the other, until one
stops bidding because he has reached his maximum bid. In this case, bidder B
would stop at e 8, so bidder A would stand out as top bidder with a current
bid of e 8 (truthfully, it should be e 8 plus a minimum bid increment, but for
simplification lets assume it stays at e 8).
There is, however, the permanent option to buy the item. During the whole auction,
any potential buyer (anyone following the auction, having placed bids or not) can
exercise buy-out option. This immediately ends the auction and whoever exercised
the option gets the item by paying a higher price than the current bid (the buy-out
price). This means that there are two different ways of getting the item (auction
or buy-out), both available throughout the entire duration of the auction to anyone
following its evolution.
When a potential buyer arrives, he can see the current winning bid and the buy-out
price. That’s all the information he can access.
Even if a buyer is set to cover all bids made, it is not certain that he will get the item
since there is the buy-out alternative. At the same time, choosing to exercise the
option is available to every potential buyer so, besides competing through bids in
the auction, each and every participant must be aware of the possible ending of the
auction and must decide either to keep bidding or ensure the item for the buy-out
price.
If the item is sold through bidding (normal auction, without anyone using the buy-
out option) then the outcome is efficient since the bidder with highest valuation gets
the item. But in the case of decision by buy-out there might be other outcomes as
the buy-out price is necessarily lower than the highest valuation among the bidders.
In the group of bidders whose item valuation is higher than the buy-out price,
competition through buy-out will happen and the fastest to trigger the option will
take the item. So, each bidder’s perception of the rivals’ valuations and his own
7
expectations of auction evolution will determine who keeps the good.
“How much are my opponents willing to bid?” and “Is the current price high enough
to assume that someone will buy-out the item soon?” are some questions that can
describe the kind of expectations that a bidder must have, in order to set a threshold
for the price evolution that will trigger his buy-out of the item through the option.
This threshold will be compared to bidding evolution and will help the buyer decide
when it is time to buy-out the item. It’s important to say that this trigger works for
both single bidding or incremental bidding strategies. For single bidding strategy
consider setting one single bid (equal to the maximum value that you are willing to
bid before buying out the item) 5 right at start and follow the auction evolution.
Incremental bidding is studied in Roth and Ockenfels (2002); Ockenfels and Roth
(2006); Peters and Severinov (2006). It’s basically a strategy defined by not bidding
your maximum at start, and raising your bid cap as you get outbid.
For single bidding strategies, the optimal value to bid will be the threshold that
comes from our model, and buying out the item will only be optimal if the agent
gets outbid and, in that case, should be done immediately. In case of incremental
strategies, the difference is that the agent will place several lower bids before setting
the threshold as his maximum value. If he doesn’t get outbid for bids lower than the
threshold, then he wins the auction. If he is forced to raise his bids and place one
with the threshold value, then he will not be willing to raise the bid any higher and
should exercise the option to buy-out the item if (and when) a competitor manages
to outbid him.
Related to the buy-out option, consider the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Assume that when the agent wants to exercise the option, only he
can get the item, meaning that a competitor who also wants to buy-out at the same
time as our agent will lose it. This implies that, when exercising the option, the
item is won by the agent with probability 1, not having to account for the possibility
of another player also exercising his option at the same time.
For modeling we use an increasing bids approach, replicating the implicit iterative
process of the proxy bidding system. This means that, in our model, bids will be
observed as a continuous increasing process instead of an increase with random
jumps.
In the end, the trigger itself will provide a threshold strategy. By setting the thresh-
5Reservation Value/Price is the highest price the buyer is willing to pay for the item. Equals
the agent’s valuation.
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old as the maximum bid in the proxy bidding program, being outbid provides the
optimal timing to exercise the option.
If expectations are reviewed during the auction due to some new information or
even auction evolution itself, the agent updates the threshold and the strategy,
transforming the optimal decision into a dynamic process.
Some of the parameters that we must address in order to define our problem are
“Reservation Price”, “Buy-out Price” and “Expected Price”. These three will be
focused during the analysis and some assumptions must be made. Let’s define these
parameters:
1. “Reservation Price” (PR) - the valuation that the agent gives to the item, the
highest value he’s willing to pay for it.
2. “Buy-out Price” (PB) - the price that one must pay to end the auction and
buy-out the item.
3. “Expected Price” (P¯ ) - represents the expectation of the ending price of the
auction without exercising the buy-out option. It’s treated as an exogenous
constant in our model.
Later we will transform these variables in their w counterparts, being each w a
valuation-to-price ratio.
In order to study the dynamics of choice between bidding and buy-out, we must
ensure that the buy-out price is a possible price to pay. This means that the reser-
vation price must be higher than the buy-out price. If, for a given agent, the buy-out
price is higher than the reservation price, there is no option. If the potential buyer
cannot pay the buy-out price, then the only way he can get the item is by bidding.
In this case, the option doesn’t have any value for the agent.
At the same time, the expected price must be lower than the buy-out price. Ex-
pecting that the bids may be higher than the buy-out price is unreasonable. If this
is not the case, when a bidder is deciding whether to bid the amount of the buy-out
price (not knowing for sure if he will win) or to exercise the option (paying the same
buy-out price and getting the item surely and immediately), he will always buy-out
the item and end the auction. When the bids reach the buy-out price, exercising
the option is the rational decision, so we can assume that no one will ever bid the
buy-out price or any other above it.
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Assumption 2. The expected auction final price must be lower than the buy-out
price, which cannot be higher than the reservation price of the agent. This implies
that PR ≥ PB > P¯ .
The Model for Single Auctions
There is only one auction available for the selected item and each potential buyer
values the item differently. Every one of them has a reservation price (PR), inde-
pendent from its competitors’ valuations. Additionally, monitoring the auction has
no costs 6.
Assume that none of the bidders knows neither how many competitors there are, nor
their reservation prices. All the information available to an agent is his valuation
(PR), the buy-out price (PB) and any kind of expectation he has about the evolution
and outcome of the auction. So he acts, and must decide, with important information
constraints.
Let’s define w as the ratio PR
P
. The higher w, the higher the amount of satisfaction
for agent. Higher possible gains in the auction, paying a lower P for a given PR,
are translated into achieving a higher w. This valuation-to-price ratio (w) reflects
the consumer surplus from the transaction (in a ratio).
Assumption 3. Assume that the agent’s welfare (w) is simply given by the ratio
between his reservation price and the price paid for the item, i.e. w = P
R
P
.
So, for each P we will have a correspondent w. Since the buyer has a reservation price
PR, defined as the maximum value he is willing to pay for the item, we can surely
assume that his bids cannot surpass PR, therefore, w > 1. Note that wR = PR
PR
= 1.
This implies that the buyer will only consider exercising the option if the buy-out
price fulfills this condition, PB ≤ PRand wB = PR
PB
≥ 1. And, as the buy-out price is
the safe outcome of the auction and is lower than the reservation price of the buyers,
we can also say that no one will ever bid higher than PB(which implies w > wB).
Assumption 2 can be transformed into:
Assumption 4. PR ≥ PB > P¯ ⇒ wR = 1 ≤ wB < w¯ = PR
P¯
.
6An extension to this model, adding the effects of monitoring costs, is presented in Appendix
A.
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2.1 Bidding
Each potential buyer only has access to information about the current price, the
buy-out price and his own expectations of the future evolution of the auction. He
must decide whether to bid until the end and hope to win the auction by normal
bidding process, or to buy-out the item for a previously determined buy-out price.
Since the goal of this model is to determine the optimal trigger for exercising of the
buy-out option, the time component of the auction - its maturity and the behaviour
of bids in each phase (beginning, mid and ending) of the auction - will be set aside
and the focus shall be on the other variables that define the trigger.
Let’s assume that before any bid is made, the potential buyer has an expectation of
the bidding behaviour throughout the auction. He believes that the bids will follow
a mean-reverting process towards that expectation value (w¯ = PR
P¯
). The results of
the model will, of course, be linked to this expectation so there should be a reviewing
process of these expectations as the auction evolves.
For modeling purposes, and because bids are placed through a proxy bidding system,
we assume that there is an infinitely small minimum bid increment.
Assumption 5. Assume that bid increments are infinitesimal.
Consider F (w) to be the value function of the option. For convenience, it is as-
sumed that there is no pre-determined time limit for the auction (remember that
the placement of a bid increases the auction’s duration), and so, the passage of time,
by itself, does not change the value of the option, nor does it influence the optimal
timing to exercise the option.
The decision between buying-out right now or waiting to buy-out later is only in-
fluenced by the evolution of bids. But if no new bids are placed, then the value
function doesn’t change.
Assumption 6. The value of the option to buy-out is time-independent:
∂F (w, t)
∂t
= 0
All eBay auctions behave like English auctions with hard closing time, but we will
not consider this duration constraint in order to exclude strategies like sniping (Roth
and Ockenfels, 2002) from our model. But not all auction websites follow the same
rules, in fact Yahoo auctions use an extending clause where any bid made in the last
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minutes adds a few more minutes to the auction, virtually extending any auction
for long periods of time.
We assume that every auction is long enough to enable this kind of behaviour, as
if it were an auction with no hard closing time, where the deadline extends every
time a bid is made. So, all bids converge to a given wfinal independently of the
duration of the auction. Some auctions will reach it sooner, others later, but the
the auction ends at a given at w = wfinal. When no additional bids are made,
the auction ends and the winner pays the current bid. This final bid is, of course,
unknown during the auction, but the agent establishes some expectations about its
value: E
[
wfinal
]
= w¯.
Each individual agent has his own w¯, meaning that in an auction with N partici-
pants each bidder i has a given w¯i, i ∈ {1, N}. Since agents don’t know each other’s
valuations or expectations, our model is set in an asymmetric information environ-
ment. The individual agent will make his decision based solely on the information
that he has available, so he won’t consider the competitor’s w¯i. In the model, only
the individual agent’s w¯ is important, and that’s the one that will be used. w¯ will
be the expectation formulated by the decision-maker (the protagonist in our model)
for the value of wfinal. This expectation will be used to model the expected bidding
behaviour next.
But how should bids evolve? Let’s keep it simple and make a deterministic expecta-
tions function. We know that each competitor has a different valuation (PR) for the
item, and we also know that some of the participants in the auction don’t value the
item high enough to buy it out. There is a scale of reservation values in the group
of competitors so, when higher value bids are placed, some of the players step out
because they don’t value the item high enough to beat those bids. As this happens,
less and less competitors stay in the auction until only one remains and wins the
item. There is also a larger number of players with lower valuations so, bids should
raise very quickly in the beginning of the auction. As a consequence, in the last
stages of the auction, bidding evolution is slower as a result of the smaller number
of remaining bidders.
Since we determined that bids could not surpass the buy-out-price, we can state
that w¯ > wB. So, our bidding process will have to account for the reducing number
of bidders as prices rise and also a cap at wB. Notice that since w is an inverse
function of P , while P increases, w decreases. As the auction develops, w will show
a decreasing behaviour.
It’s expected that bids will converge to a final bid, so P will increase towards P¯
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(the expected P true for our agent), meaning that w will decrease towards w (the
expected wfinal for the agent).
Assumption 7. Bidding behaviour (in terms of w) is defined by the following mean-
reversion process:
dw = η(w¯ − w)dt (2.1)
Where w¯ is the expected wfinal and η is the speed of adjustment (higher η means that
the auction will have a faster bidding evolution). It will be a parameter to calibrate
the expected amount of time needed to achieve w¯.
The next figure shows a mean reversion process representation for PR = 125e, P¯ =
100e(which is the same as having w¯ = 1.25) and η = 0.3, with P = 25e(meaning
w = 5) when t = 0. This would be the behaviour of the processes with continuous
time increments:
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Figure 2.1: Mean-Reversion Processes in variables P and w
Even though the bids follow a deterministic process, the model and the final outcome
are not deterministic since there is expected competition through buy-out. Notice
how during the entire auction the option is present. It is possible that any other
buyer decides to exercise it, ending the auction by doing so. This event will be
treated as a catastrophic event, following a Poisson process with occurring intensity
λ.
The auction that we’re considering will be treated as the last chance to get the
item. If someone wins by buy-out, all the other competitors lose the chance to get
the item. If that happens, then the option ceases to exist and so, it stops having
value for the agent.
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2.2 Option Value and Optimal Behaviour
To address the problem we follow the real options approach (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).
Let F (w) be the value function for the option to buy-out the item at strike price PB.
F (w) will represent some sort of net welfare from exercising the option to buy-out,
considering the surplus wB and the loss of the possibility to win the auction at a
price lower than PB (and therefore, the possibility to obtain a higher surplus).
When a competitor buys the item using the option, our agent loses his option and
it’s value disappears. This catastrophic event will be traduced in the value function
as a jump (a sudden change of value). With occurring intensity λ, the value function
will jump from F (w) to 0. In equation (2.3), this event will appear as:
λ [0− F (w)] (2.2)
Considering the mean reverting process in equation (2.1) and catastrophic event
from (2.2), by using Ito’s lemma we achieve the following differential equation:
dF (w)dt =
1
2
∂2F (w)
∂w2
(dw)2 +
∂F (w)
∂w
dw + λ[0− F (w)]dt (2.3)
From equation (2.1), (dw)2 is given by:
(dw)2 = η2 (w¯ − w)2 dt2
Since dt2 tends to zero faster than dt, by the standard argument it can be ignored,
so:
dt2 = 0⇒ (dw)2 = 0 (2.4)
Combining equations (2.1), (2.3), and (2.4), and after dividing by dt we get:
dF (w) =
∂F (w)
∂w
η (w¯ − w) + λ[0− F (w)]
dF (w) =
∂F (w)
∂w
η (w¯ − w)− λF (w) (2.5)
The buy-out option available in the auction is free and, at the same time, automat-
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ically given to anyone who follows the auction. Accordingly, the buy-out option is
not tradable in the market and the agent doesn’t earn any returns by holding it:
dF (w) = 0 (2.6)
The value function that we are trying to determine will be divided in two branches.
The first branch will represent the intrinsic and the remaining time value of the
option, whereas the other one will represent the payoff of the option when all the
time value has been depleted. The trigger w∗ will provide the optimal timing to
exercise the option, the moment where the option loses all its time value and so,
provide the threshold between the two branches.
Let’s start by the continuation region, where w > w∗ and it is not yet optimal to
exercise the option.
Combining equations (2.5) and (2.6):
∂F (w)
∂w
η (w¯ − w)− λF (w) = 0 (2.7)
The differential equation (2.7) has the following general solution:
F (w) = C1(wη − w¯η)−
λ
η
where C1 is an arbitrary constant that needs to be determined.
As for the second region (where w ≤ w∗), the payoff of the option is simply given
by:
F (w) = wB − φw
This is the intrinsic value of the option, the agent receives wB when exercising it but
gives up on φw. The parameter φ represents the probability7 of not being placed
more bids and not being exercised the option by any competitor (for that level of w)
or, in other words, the probability of the auction ending without the option being
exercised and the agent getting the item with the current surplus (w). So, −φw
traduces an opportunity cost (in terms of welfare) for exercising the buy-out option.
7Since φ is a constant expectation parameter it should be revised frequently. Additionally, by
considering φ to be weighted by the risk aversion coefficient, we can introduce risk aversion into
the model. In this dissertation we don’t explore this possibility and treat the model as if risk
neutrality was assumed.
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Our goal is to determine the the trigger (w∗) and the value function. But to achieve
the value function we need to determine the trigger (w∗) , which will mark the
optimal threshold (i.e. the value of w for which is optimal to exercise the option to
buy-out), and also the constant C1 for the first branch.
To determine two unknown variables we need two boundary conditions:
F (w∗) = wB − φw∗ (2.8)
∂F (w)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=w∗
= −φ (2.9)
These represent the so-called “value-matching” (2.8) and the “smooth-pasting” (2.9)
conditions. Equation (2.8) is usually called the “value-matching condition” because
it matches the values of the function F (w) to those of the payoff function. When
exercising the option, the buyer earns wB but loses the opportunity to win the
auction at the current bid and receive w∗ (that would occur with probability φ). As
PB > P ∗, the buy-out option eliminates any uncertainty about the outcome of the
deal, but does so by making the buyer pay a premium over the current bid (P ∗)
and settle for an inferior level of welfare (wB < w∗). To achieve certainty about the
terms of the transaction, the buyer loses the chance to get higher gains through the
auction.
Notice that the value matching condition brings another condition, we need the
option value to be positive in w∗ in order to ensure economic rationality to the
problem. The option can not have a negative value when the agent is supposed to
exercise it. So, we get wB − φw∗ > 0.
Recalling Assumption 4 and considering this condition, we can say that wB ≥ 1 ∧
wB > φw∗. This means that, to be acceptable, the buy-out decision must give the
agent a “value-for-money” greater (or equal) than 1 and must also compensate for
the loss of welfare related to the chance (not certain) of acquiring the item at a lower
price. This condition will be of use later on.
As for equation (2.9), it ensures that the value function has smooth pasting when
switching from one branch to the other.
Proposition 1. Solving these equations, one can achieve the value function and
trigger value.
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F (w) =

1
λ
(
[(w − w¯)η]−λη φ
[
ηλ(wB−w¯φ)
(η+λ)φ
] η+λ
η
)
, w > w∗
wB − φw , w ≤ w∗
(2.10)
where:
w∗ =
wBλ+ w¯ηφ
(η + λ)φ
(2.11)
Further analysis of this trigger w∗ can show a concealed and interesting finding.
Proposition 2. By transforming w∗ in the respective P ∗, we achieve:
P ∗ =
(η + λ)φP¯PB
P¯ λ+ ηφPB
(2.12)
Proof. Recall that wB = PR
PB
and w¯ = PR
P¯
and note that w∗ can be written as
w∗ = P
R
P ∗ .
Rearranging equation (2.11):
w∗ =
wBλ+ w¯ηφ
(η + λ)φ
⇔ P
R
P ∗
=
PR
PB
λ+ P
R
P¯
ηφ
(η + λ)φ
⇔ P ∗ = (η + λ)φP¯P
B
P¯ λ+ ηφPB
Notice the variables that change P ∗: The model parameters η, λ, and φ, as well
as the buy-out and the expected auction prices (PB and P¯ respectively). However,
and contrary to some previous work on the matter (Hidvégi et al., 2006; Reynolds
and Wooders, 2009; Chen et al., 2011), we find that the threshold in not dependent
on PR. This is an interesting finding, which contradicts previous approaches to the
problem.
Focus on the choice at hand, either the agent chooses a certain deal paying PB or
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he takes risks in order to achieve a better deal for a price P with P < PB (risking
to lose the item to a competitor who exercises the option).
In terms of difference between both alternatives, we can say that the certain deal
gives the agent a surplus of
[
PR − PB]. But on the other hand, winning the auction
at price P (uncertain deal) results on a surplus of
[
PR − P ] with [PR − P ] >[
PR − PB]. The risky alternative offers a higher potential gain but with uncertainty.
Still, this higher potential gain is exactly
[
PB − P ], whatever the reservation price
of the agent may be.
Note that the agent would be interested in getting the item if he was offered any
of the two prices (PB or P ), since he has a positive surplus. In a normal shopping
situation, if the agent had seen the item in a store at price PB or at price P , he
would have bought it. And the same would have happened if he had been given a
chance to bid those prices in a regular auction without options. The agent would be
interested in either one of the alternatives if it was presented to him, but our goal is
to determine which one does he choose when presented with both at the same time.
Whichever the valuation of the agent may be (respecting Assumption 2), the dif-
ference between both alternatives is always
[
PB − P ]. For similar agents with the
same expectations (about η, λ, φ and P¯ ) but with different valuations (different PR),
the decision is the same. They both compare the risky and non-risky alternatives
(using their similar expectations) and find the exact same threshold P ∗ that marks
the point in which the risky alternative’s higher surplus
[
PB − P ] stops being worth
the risk of losing the item.
Two different agents may have two different thresholds (P ∗) that mark the points
where the risky8 alternative’s superior surplus is no longer worth the risk. But if the
agents’ valuations don’t influence the thresholds, how can two players have differ-
ent P ∗? The differentiating factor must be connected to the expectations of future
bidding development (evolution of P ). Any differences in the trigger should be a re-
sult of expectation differences between the agents, traduced in different expectation
parameters η, λ, φ and P¯ .
2.3 Analytical Comparative Statics
Before presenting the analysis, remember the constraint from the value matching
condition:
8Even though the parameter φ could be treated as a probability weighted by risk aversion, we
are not taking into account any effects of agents’ aversion to risk in the model.
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wB − φw∗ > 0 (2.13)
As previously stated, this condition must be fulfilled in order to ensure that the
option has positive value in the optimal exercising moment (w∗). But since w∗ is
itself a function of φ we can expand the constraint and achieve a direct constraint
for the values of φ. Combining equations (2.11) and (2.13):
wB − φw
Bλ+ w¯ηφ
(η + λ)φ
> 0
⇔ φ < w
B
w¯
(2.14)
The following derivatives show the threshold’s reactions to parameter adjustments:
∂w∗
∂wB =
λ
(η+λ)φ > 0
∂w∗
∂w¯ =
η
η+λ > 0
∂w∗
∂φ = − w
Bλ
(η+λ)φ2 < 0
∂w∗
∂λ =
η(wB−w¯φ)
(η+λ)2φ > 0, for φ <
wB
w¯
∂w∗
∂η =
−wBλ+w¯λφ
(η+λ)2φ < 0, for φ <
wB
w¯
As expected, wBand w¯ have a positive relation with w∗. For auctions with lower
buy-out prices (therefore higher wB), and auctions with lower expected final bids
(higher w¯), the valuation-to-price threshold given by w∗ will also be higher.
As for φ, the higher the probability of winning without needing to exercise the
option, the lesser will be the need to tighten the threshold. At the same time, a
lower φ means a lower opportunity cost, so the disadvantage of delaying the exercise
of the option is smaller. As shown by the derivative, a higher φ induces a decrease
in w∗, reflecting these effects.
For the derivatives in order to λ and η there is a constraint for φ for it to be positive
(λ) or negative (η). Note that this constraint is exactly the same constraint that
we extracted from the value matching condition (2.13) when transformed into a
19
restriction for φ (2.14). So, while respecting the positive option-value for w = w∗,
we ensure that ∂w∗
∂λ
> 0 and ∂w∗
∂η
< 0.
Being ∂w∗
∂λ
positive implies that when the risk of competition is higher (when the
player believes that there is a higher chance of loosing the item to a competitor who
acts first and ends the auction) the result is a more restrictive strategy. Ceteris
paribus, a higher λ will lower the trigger price (therefore higher w∗) anticipating the
exercise of the option.
Lastly, lower η will tighten the threshold as it represents an increase in auction
“duration” and, therefore, a wider window of opportunity for competitors to buy-
out the item. Not duration per se (as in time duration), but as a slower achievement
of the expected final result.
Additionally, by focusing on the threshold (equation 2.11) we can study the following
extreme case-scenarios and interpret its results:
lim
λ→0
w∗ = w¯
By removing all competition from the model (λ → 0) the threshold is w¯, meaning
that the agent would never exercise the buy-out option. He would bid until he
won the auction since no one else would exercise the buy-out option. Recalling
Assumption 4 (wB < w¯), even though the result from bidding in the auction is still
uncertain (remember that the agent expects it to be w¯, but he is not sure), bidding
is always better than the buy-out result since there is no chance to lose the item
and there is no chance for the item to be priced higher than PB (Assumption 2).
lim
λ→+∞
w∗ =
wB
φ
Recall the condition from equation 2.13, it can be rewritten into w∗ < wB
φ
. This
represents the boundary for levels of w that ensure a positive payoff for exercising
the option. When the competition level reaches its maximum (represented here by
λ → +∞), the exercise of the option by a competitor is imminent, so the agent
will exercise the option as soon as possible while ensuring that he still gets a non-
negative outcome. The threshold w∗ = wB
φ
marks the point where exercising the
option grants the agent a null expected payoff (in terms of net welfare), and that’s
as “soon” as the agent can exercise the option with non-negative outcome.
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lim
φ→0
w∗ = +∞
When the probability of winning the item without exercising the buy-out option is
zero, the agent has no other alternative to get the item except by buying it out.
In this case, the threshold w∗ = +∞ represents, in terms of prices, a price P = 0,
meaning that the agent will exercise the option immediately. He has absolutely no
chance to win through bidding so the rational decision is to exercise the buy-out
option immediately and prevent any other competitor from buying it.
lim
φ→wB
w¯
w∗ = w¯
Lastly, when the probability of winning the item without buying it out is maxed
(recall the condition given by equation 2.14) the agent never buys-out the item.
The threshold is w¯ (the same as in the case of λ → +∞), meaning that the agent
will never exercise the option. If we focus on the condition φ < wB
w¯
and what it
represents, we see that φ = wB
w¯
implies that exercising the option grants the agent
a null payoff. If exercising the option doesn’t give the agent any positive surplus
then why should he chose to do it when he has a positive alternative? When the
expected probability of winning without the option is maxed, bidding until the end
is the rational decision.
2.4 Numerical Example and Results
Let’s make a simulation through a numerical example. Consider the following ex-
ample:
An economic agent is interested in buying an item. He finds an auction for the said
item and decides to enter it. The auction has a buy-out option and his valuation
for the item is higher than the buy-out price. The player builds his expectations
with experience from his search and previous auctions that he attended and decides
these parameters:
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Parameter Value Description
wB 1.10 Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio
(
PR
PB
)
w¯ 1.25 Expected Final Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
(
PR
P¯
)
w - Current Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
η 0.30 Adjustment velocity in the mean-reverting process
λ 0.35 Probability of losing the auction to a competitor’s Buy-Out
φ 0.40 Probability of winning through bidding at the threshold w∗
Table 2.1: Model Parameters - Single Auction Example
Applying the equations (2.10) and (2.11) we achieve the following results:
Output Value
w∗ 2.05769
Table 2.2: Threshold Result
w*
2 3 4 5
w
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
FHwL
(w decreases as the auction progresses)
Figure 2.2: Option’s Value and Optimal Trigger for Single Auction
The strategy that the agent should play can be described in the following manner:
Keep bidding if the price is so that w > w∗. When w reaches w∗, the agent should
leave the bidding process and buy-out the item paying PB (to which corresponds a
valuation-price ratio of wB). If, by any chance, the the price is already higher than
P ∗ (meaning w < w∗), either by entering after the auction start or in case of the
starting bid being too high, the agent should exercise the option and buy-out the
item immediately.
Here is where Real Options Theory makes the difference. By doing a simple cost-
benefit analysis, we see that the agent would have a non-negative gain from exercising
the buy-out (wB ≥ 1). However, because he has the option to delay the buy-out
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and try to net a better outcome through the auction, we find that he won’t choose
to buy the item right away just for that non-negative outcome. In fact, he will only
commit to the buy-out when the bidding amount reaches approximately half of his
reserve price (w∗ ' 2⇔ P ∗ ' PR
2
). For any price lower than P ∗ the agent will still
try to win the auction without exercising the option. For any price equal or higher
than P ∗ the higher potential gains are not worth the risk of losing the item to a
competitor who exercises the option.
So, we managed to achieve a threshold that can be observed by the agent clearly
and help him make the decision to buy-out. If that threshold is not reached then
the buyer will risk and try to get the item through auction with bids lower than P ∗.
Not only can we say that the buyer should think about bidding instead of instantly
buying the item, but we can also assure that he won’t be risking loosing for a small
premium as he will only stay away from the “buy-it-now” decision if the bids don’t
rise too much. If he sees that his window of higher gains is closing he won’t keep
taking unnecessary risks, instead he will buy-out the item and ensure that he gets
it with 100% chance.
Expectation Reviewing
As there are many expectation variables in play, the results may not be static for
the entire auction duration. At any given time, and based on new information, the
agent can change his mind and formulate new expectations changing the results
and the threshold for w. In case of expectation reviewing the agent should accept
the new results and act accordingly. Let the following example show you what this
means:
Let λ′, φ′ and w¯′ be the reviewed expected parameters. For instance, the agent
was surprised by his competitor’s behaviour in the early stages of the auction and
concluded that he had underestimated their interest in the item. As a consequence,
λ and w¯ were underestimated and φ was overestimated.
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Parameter Value Description
wB 1.10 Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio
(
PR
PB
)
w¯ 1.25 Expected Final Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
(
PR
P¯
)
w¯′ 1.15 Reviewed w¯
w - Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
η 0.30 Adjustment velocity in the mean-reverting process
λ 0.35 Probability of losing the auction to a competitor’s Buy-Out
λ′ 0.40 Reviewed λ
φ 0.40 Probability of winning through bidding at the threshold w∗
φ′ 0.30 Reviewed φ
Table 2.3: Model Parameters - Expectations Review
Output Value
w∗ 2.05769
w′∗ 2.58810
Table 2.4: Threshold Changes
F(w)
F '(w)
w ' *
w*
2 3 4 5
w
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
FHwL
(w decreases as the auction progresses)
Figure 2.3: Option’s Value and Optimal Triggers for Single Auction - Comparison
As a consequence of his review of expectations, the agent now determines a harsher
threshold. He recognizes a larger threat in his competitors and is willing to buy-out
the item sooner (w′∗ > w∗). It is important to refer that this review can happen at
any time during the auction, both to increase and to decrease expectations about
competitors’ valuations, and it can happen as many times as the agent changes his
mind. The results will change as demonstrated in this example and the optimal
behaviour for the agent will adapt according to his new expectations.
What this represents is a dynamic result, subject to the agents thoughts at every
moment. In truth, to use this method in a real world scenario would require a con-
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stant adjustment of the parameters to accommodate the dynamics of the strategy.
If the new threshold hasn’t been reached yet, then the behaviour should be the
same as before, just with a new trigger value. But if the review process results in
a threshold that has already been surpassed then the option should be exercised
immediately.
The Model for Sequential Auctions
Let’s consider a new auction for an equivalent item that starts after the first auction.
The second (and last9) auction starts only after the first one ended, and is similar to
the previous one. This will give the participants in the first auction a second chance
to buy the item, decreasing the intensity of competition in their first interaction.
Like in the single auction case scenario, none of the bidders knows neither how many
competitors there are, nor their reservation prices. This time all the information
available to an agent is his valuation (PR), his expectations and the buy-out prices
of all the auctions. Every participant knows that there are sequential auctions and
also knows the buy-out prices of each of these auctions. The decision for one auction
takes into account the conditions of that auction but also considers the available
information about the future auctions.
All the assumptions made in the single auction model will be kept for the sequential
auctions model, and some new assumptions will be added.
Let w(P,N) ≡ wN(P ) be the valuation-to-price ratio when N auctions (including
the current one) are available. Accordingly, considering only two sequential auctions
(N ∈ {1, 2}), w2 will represent the usual w = PRP during the first auction and w1
will refer to the last auction.
All the potential buyers know that after the first auction ends, another one will
start. And all of them, except for the one who bought the item in the first auction,
will try to win the last auction as well. Most of the agents remain the same, but
after the end of the first auction there is one less chance to get the item, so the
remaining players will now change their behaviour and decide to buy-out the item
sooner than they would in the first auction.
Assumption 8. To traduce the increment in the level of competition between auc-
tions we define λ1 > λ2, meaning that the probability of a competitor exercising the
option before w∗ is reached is higher in the last auction than in the previous one.
9The model is defined for a 2 auctions environment but could be extended for N > 2 auctions.
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Additionally, the first auction’s buy-out price (represented by PB2 ) must be lower
than the second auction’s price (PB1 ). If this is not the case, then there is no reason
to buy-out in the first auction. By not buying the item and just keep bidding, a
bidder ensures that he will bid with no cost because even if he looses the first item
to a competitor, he will always have a chance to buy it out immediately after for
an equal or lower price. So, it will never be optimal to buy-out at the first auction
as the second buy-out is just as profitable and there is no cost for losing the first
auction’s option. It’s as if the option was postponed to the second auction without
any penalty, and according to the real options perspective (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994)
the agent always chooses to defer the option to exercise if there is no associated cost.
Assumption 9. In sequential auctions we assume that wB1 < wB2 , traducing PB1 >
PB2 in terms of buy-out prices.
3.1 Bidding
The bidding process is the same as in the previous case. The main difference is
noticed in the event of losing the auction by buy-out from another participant. In
the single auction case-scenario, if any competitor buys the item by buy-out, all
the chances for ever getting the item are lost. With a second auction on the table,
if the first auction is lost in those circumstances, there is still the opportunity to
enter another one and buy the item there. This could be seen as a “pre-auction”
interaction, that takes place before the “main” auction.
The main implication from this is reflected in the differential equation, adding a
positive component to the catastrophic event’s outcome. Instead of losing−λ2F2(w),
the expected loss is given by −λ2 [F1(w)− F2(w)], reflecting the loss of F2(w) and
the gain of the last auction’s option value F1(w).
F1(w) is the value function of the last auction at the point when it’s starting. Since
the auctions are sequential, and as the buyers are mostly the same, it’s safe to
assume that when the first auction ends, all buyers switch to the second auction
and immediately set the bid they had in the previous one. So, the second auction
starts exactly at the same point where the first ended, there is no break in the
continuity of bids between both auctions. Therefore, the remaining value when the
catastrophic event occurs, is F1(w). As the option value changes accordingly to the
current w, when the first auction is lost due to buy-out, the remaining value is that
of the last auction’s option valued at current bid.
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3.2 Option Value and Optimal Behaviour
Consider F2(w) and F1(w) the value functions for the first and last auctions, re-
spectively. F2(w) is the function for the auction taking place first, when there are 2
auctions available (the current and the last one). F1(w) refers to the last auction.
Let’s assume that η, φ and w¯ won’t change between the two auctions. The items
must be similar and the competitors are most likely the same, so these expectations
don’t change. The only reason to change them would be due to a review of ex-
pectations. Notice that wB will change between auctions. In this case, the second
buy-out price must be higher than the first as stated in Assumption 9
(
wB2 > w
B
1
)
.
The parameter λ will differ between both auctions because the last auction is similar
to the first in its structure and rules but the competition is higher now since the
item for sale is the last one available. It is expected that during the transition to
the second auction the competition through BiN becomes fiercer .
We will solve this problem using a backwards approach, solving the last auction
with the same method as before, and then using the results in the first auction.
The last auction is treated as if it was a single auction, since there is no auction
afterwards. The results are the same as the ones for the single auction environment.
The problem is the same, with the same differential equation:
dF1(w) =
∂F1(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w)− λ1F1(w) = 0 (3.1)
Subject to the following boundary conditions 10:
F1(w
∗
1) = w
B
1 − φw∗1 (3.2)
∂F1(w1)
∂w1
∣∣∣∣
w1=w∗1
= −φ (3.3)
Proposition 3. Equation (3.1) is the equivalent of equation (2.7) in the single
auction scenario. And equations (3.2) and (3.3) are the same boundary conditions
as before. As a result, the procedure is the same and the corresponding trigger and
value function are as follow.
10The value function has to be positive to be rational for the agent to exercise the option, so
F1(w
∗
1) = w
B
1 − φw∗1 > 0.
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F1(w) =

1
λ1
(
[(w − w¯)η] −λ1η
[(
wB1 λ1+w¯ηφ
(η+λ1)φ
− w¯
)
η
] η+λ1
η
φ
)
, w > w∗1
wB1 − φw , w ≤ w∗1
(3.4)
where:
w∗1 =
wB1 λ1 + w¯ηφ
(η + λ1)φ
(3.5)
So far, we have simply set the single auction as the last auction in the sequential auc-
tion problem. Now, let’s use the value function of the last auction in the preceding
one.
Consider now the first auction of the two. Since the value doesn’t fully disappear
when another participant buys the item through buy-out, the differential equation
for the first auction suffers a small modification:
dF2(w) =
∂F2(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w) + λ2 [F1(w)− F2(w)] = 0 (3.6)
−
∂F2(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w)− λ2F2(w)
λ2
= F1(w) (3.7)
Equation (3.7) can be rearranged, using the value function for the last auction (3.4),
into:
−
∂F2(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w)− λ2F2(w)
λ2
=

[(w−w¯)η]−
λ1
η
[(
wB1 λ1+w¯ηφ
(η+λ1)φ
−w¯
)
η
] η+λ1
η
φ
λ1
, w > w∗1
wB1 − φw , w ≤ w∗1
The boundary conditions 11 are the same, with the respective parameters:
F2(w
∗
2) = w
B
2 − φw∗2
∂F2(w2)
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
w2=w∗2
= −φ
11See footnote 10, F2(w∗2) = wB2 − φw∗2 > 0.
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Proposition 4. So for the auction taking place first we have the following value
function and trigger:
F2(w) =

[(w − w¯)η]−
λ2
η
−
[(w − w¯)η]
−λ1+λ2
η λ2φ
[
ηλ1(w
B
1 −w¯φ)
(η+λ1)φ
] η+λ1
η
λ1(λ1 − λ2)
+A
 , w > w∗1
(−wB1 + wB2 ) η [(w − w¯) η]−λ2η [ (−wB1 +wB2 )λ2φ ]
λ2
η
η + λ2
+B , w∗2 < w ≤ w∗1
wB2 − φw , w ≤ w∗2
(3.8)
where:
A =
(wB1 − wB2 )η(λ1 − λ2)
(
(−wB1 +wB2 )λ2
φ
)λ2
η − (η + λ1)φ
(
ηλ1(wB1 −w¯φ)
(η+λ1)φ
) η+λ2
η
(η + λ2)(−λ1 + λ2)
B = wB1 −
w¯η + wλ2φ
η + λ2
and
w∗2 = w¯ +
(wB2 − wB1 )λ2
ηφ
(3.9)
The reason for F2(w) to have 3 branches lies with the possible scenarios when the
transition between auctions happens. The last auction has a more strict threshold
(w∗2 < w∗1). As it is the last chance to buy the item, buyers are not willing to risk as
much as before and decide to exercise the option sooner than they would in the first
auction 12. This creates a gap between [w∗2, w∗1], where the behaviour is not simply
to chose either to bid or to buy. With a multiple auctions environment, besides
deciding whether to bid or not to bid, the player must also decide in which auction
he should bid or buy.
Imagine an agent going through the decision process:
• For w ≤ w∗2 < w∗1, it is optimal to exercise the option right away on the first
auction.
• For w∗2 < w ≤ w∗1, the agent’s trigger to exercise the option has not yet been
reached in the first auction so the agent should wait. But in case some other
12This should happen for the majority of the cases, but in an exceptional case-scenario this may
not be true due to high differences in buy-out prices. See Appendix B for further explanation.
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buyer buys-out the item before his threshold w∗2 is reached, the last auction
will start and the agent will buy-out the item immediately.
• For w∗2 < w∗1 < w, whatever happens, the agent will wait. He will wait for w∗2
in the first auction and keep bidding, and if someone ends the auction before
that barrier is reached he will enter the last auction and bid normally until w∗1
is reached.
Proposition 5. Using the same approach as before, when turning equation (2.11)
into equation (2.12), we can rearrange equation (3.9) and achieve the optimal price
threshold for the first auction:
P ∗2 =
PB1 P
B
2 ηφP¯
PB1 P
B
2 ηφ+ P¯ (P
B
1 − PB2 )λ2
Proof.
w∗2 = w¯ +
(wB2 − wB1 )λ2
ηφ
⇔ P
R
P ∗2
=
PR
P¯
+
(
PR
PB2
− PR
PB1
)
λ2
ηφ
⇔ P ∗2 =
PB1 P
B
2 ηφP¯
PB1 P
B
2 ηφ+ P¯ (P
B
1 − PB2 )λ2
Once again, the price threshold is independent from PR. This means that, besides
expectation related parameters, the trigger is only affected by changes in the buy-out
prices.
3.3 Analytical Comparative Statics
Each parameter influences w∗2 according to these derivatives:
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∂w∗2
∂w¯
> 0
∂w∗2
∂λ2
> 0
∂w∗2
∂λ1
= 0
∂w∗2 < 0
∂w∗2 < 0
These parameters keep the same effects as in the previous scenario. The expected
auction price (w¯) keeps affecting the trigger in a positive way, if the agent expects
the bidding to stop at higher w¯ (lower price P¯ ), then he will also set a higher trigger
w∗, exercising the option sooner.
The effects of λs are divided in two since now we’re considering two different auctions
with different λ (λ1 and λ2):
• Notice how ∂w
∗
2
∂λ1
= 0, this means that the threshold of the first auction is not
affected by the last auction’s probability of losing the item for a competitor’s
buy-out. Competition through buy-out in the last auction does not influence
the decision in the first one because we are assuming that the agent wins
the item when he reaches the trigger (Assumption 1), the option’s payout is
independent from any λ in our model.
• ∂w
∗
2
∂λ2
> 0 simply traduces the increased competition effect in the current auc-
tion. As before, higher competition will make the agent exercise the option
sooner.
As for φ, with higher probability of winning the item through auction at the thresh-
old price the agent has a higher cost when exercising the option, so the the optimal
timing is delayed (lower w∗) with an increase of φ.
The effects of η are the same as before, lower η will tighten the threshold as it
represents a slower achievement of the final expected result and, therefore, a wider
window of opportunity for competitors to buy-out the item.
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Since now the model also has two different buy-out prices, let’s focus on their effects:
∂w∗2
∂wB2
=
λ2
ηφ
> 0
∂w∗2
∂wB1
= −λ2
ηφ
< 0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
w1
B
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
w2
B
1.5
2.0
w2
*
Figure 3.1: Buy-out prices effects on the first auction’s threshold
The analysis of the effects of wB1 and wB2 are shown in Figure (3.1). Imposing that
wB1 < w
B
2 we ignore the right half the plane. As wB2 increases, the first auction’s
threshold gets more restrictive to reflect the better result of the buy-out and the
higher difference facing the second auction’s buy-out price. On the other hand,
when the last auction’s buy-out valuation-to-price ratio increases (higher wB1 ), the
first auction’s trigger w∗2 decreases to account for the better conditions in the last
auction’s buy-out option.
Additionally, the following proposition can be set:
Proposition 6. As the buy-out prices become closer
(
wB1 → wB2
)
, the first auction’s
threshold approaches the expected final bid (w∗2 → w¯).
lim
wB1 →wB2
(w∗2) = w¯
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Proof.
lim
wB1 →wB2
(w∗2) = lim
wB1 →wB2
(
w¯ +
(−wB1 + wB2 )λ2
ηφ
)
= w¯
When wB1 → wB2 the agent starts to have very few reasons to chose the first buy-out
over the second and just bids to try to win through auction. He will only buy-out
the item when w reaches the point where he thinks that bidding will stop. If his
expectations are reviewed, he will keep waiting for the “new” final expected bid
to buy-out the item, which means that the agent will never exercise the option to
buy-out in the first auction.
3.4 Numerical Example and Results
Like in the previous case, consider this example:
Parameter Value Description
wB2 1.20 Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio in the first auction
(
PR
PB2
)
wB1 1.10 Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio in the last auction
(
PR
PB1
)
w¯ 1.30 Expected Final Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
w - Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
η 0.30 Adjustment velocity in the mean-reverting process
λ2 0.35 Probability of a competitor’s Buy-Out in the first auction
λ1 0.45 Probability of a competitor’s Buy-Out in the last auction
φ 0.40 Probability of winning through bidding at the threshold w∗
Table 3.1: Model Parameters - Sequential Auction Example
Applying equations (3.4), (3.5), (3.8), and (3.9), the results are as follow:
Output Value
w∗2 1.59167
w∗1 2.17
Table 3.2: Threshold Results
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Figure 3.2: Option’s Value and Optimal Trigger for Sequential Auctions - First
Auction
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F1HwL
(w decreases as the auction progresses)
Figure 3.3: Option’s Value and Optimal Trigger for Sequential Auctions - Last
Auction
Expectation Reviewing
Just as in the single auction scenario, the agent can review his expectations as new
information arrives. The following example will show some possible consequences:
Let λ1 and λ2, φ and w¯ be the reviewed parameters. Let’s assume that the com-
petition was underestimated, the amount that the agents are willing to bid and the
probability of a competitor buying out the item are higher, so the probability of
winning through bidding is lower. The following table shows the changes in the pa-
rameters. Keep in mind that now we have two different λs that are being reviewed.
So, let’s see what happens when each one of them is reviewed alone and when both
are reviewed together.
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Parameter Value Description
wB2 1.20 First Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio in the first auction
(
PR
PB2
)
wB1 1.10 Last Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio in the last auction
(
PR
PB1
)
w¯ 1.30 Expected Final Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
w¯′ 1.25 Reviewed w¯
w - Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
η 0.30 Adjustment velocity in the mean-reverting process
λ2 0.35 Probability of a competitor’s Buy-Out in the first auction
λ1 0.45 Probability of a competitor’s Buy-Out in the last auction
λ′2 0.40 Reviewed λ2
λ′1 0.50 Reviewed λ1
φ 0.40 Probability of winning through bidding at the threshold w∗
φ′ 0.30 Reviewed φ
w∗2 1.59167 Initial Threshold for w2
w∗1 2.17 Initial Threshold for w1
Table 3.3: Model Parameters - Expectations Review
Expectations Reviewed
Output Value
w′∗2 1.69444
w′∗1 2.76042
λ2 Unchanged
Output Value
w′∗2 1.63889
w′∗1 2.76042
λ1 Unchanged
Output Value
w′∗2 1.69444
w′∗1 2.7
Table 3.4: Threshold Changes
The next Figures show the effects on the first auction’s option value caused by the
review of expectations. Consider the darker line as the situation before the review
and the lighter line as the post-review function. There is one figure for each of the
following cases:
• Expectations Review Effects for reviewed w¯, φ, λ2 and λ1 (Figure 3.4).
• Expectations Review Effects for reviewed w¯, φ, and λ1 (λ2 is kept unchanged)
(Figure 3.5).
• Expectations Review Effects for reviewed w¯, φ, and λ2 (λ1 is kept unchanged)
(Figure 3.6).
It’s easy to see that the option’s value increases in all cases, which is mainly justified
by the new expectation about competition that the player has. Now, he considers
his competitors to be a larger threat, so the option to beat all the competition and
ensure the certain gain increases in value (the figures show that F ′2(w) dominates
F2(w) for all values of w).
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Figure 3.4: Review effects
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Figure 3.5: With λ2 unchanged
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Figure 3.6: With λ1 unchanged
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Just like in the single auction environment, a review of expectations towards a more
competitive environment resulted in stricter thresholds because the agent is exposed
to stronger competition (or at least that’s what he expects). Notice, however, that
altering λ induces changes depending on which λ was reviewed. It’s obvious that,
given the changes in φ and w¯, there will be more strict thresholds for both w1 and
w2 (Figure 3.4), but look how λ1 and λ2 affect them. When λ2 changes, the effect on
w∗2 is the same whether λ1 changes or not (Figure 3.4 - Figure 3.6). And the same
happens when λ1 is reviewed and we observe w∗1: for λ2 and λ′2 the trigger (w∗1) is
the same (Figure 3.4 - Figure 3.5).
This shows once more that each auction’s threshold is not sensitive to the other auc-
tion’s λ. It means that auctions are connected through some variables/expectations,
but not all of those affect the thresholds in the same way and at the same time. In
this case, different degrees of competition in one auction have no effect on the other
auctions’ thresholds.
Also notice how the changes in w∗1 and in w∗2 are so much different in value (Figure
3.4). The second auction’s threshold, w∗1, is much more sensitive to this review of
expectations than w∗2. This could mean either one of two things: either the last
auction alters the reaction (the fact of being the last chance to get the item is really
decisive and amplifies the effects of a worst-case scenario); or perhaps the change is
in the first auction (by having a second chance, the effects that should be greater
are reduced simply because it isn’t a complete loss). Comparing these results to
the expectation review in the single auction case-scenario we see that the effects of
a review of expectations (traducing an increase in expected competition) are very
noticeable in the threshold. The trigger w∗1 suffers a tremendous increase in single
and in sequential auction’s case-scenario and, in both cases, it is considered the last
chance to win the item (being also the only chance to win it in the single auction).
This indicates that there is a “soft” approach to the situation in the first auction as
there is the “safety net” (the next auction) that grants the agent a second chance to
purchase the item. But this doesn’t happen in the last auction, which will always
be treated as a single one. Therefore, the existence of multiple auctions influences
agent behaviour during all auctions except the last, when they will behave just as
they would in a single auction.
37
Chapter III
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we addressed a recent economical problem with a different ap-
proach from any previous work on the matter. Auctions with options emerged in the
last decade and there haven’t been many different attempts to solve this question,
so there is still much to explore in this subject.
This work contributes to reduce the lack of different approaches and also to bring at-
tention to the connection that exists between these new auctions and other subjects
of economic study. We proposed a model that treated the buy-out option as a real
option and applied real options theory in order to formally define the problem. This
allowed us to determine the value of the buy-out option and achieve the optimal
behaviour for the agent.
Previous attempts to describe the optimal strategy relied on thresholds that were
dependent on the agent’s valuation for the item, but our model provided an inter-
esting finding about the factors that influence the decision, namely the trigger being
independent from the reservation price of the agent.
By addressing the situation focusing on the different possible gains between the
two alternatives we showed that, despite the agents’ valuations, the differences in
possible gains was always the same, meaning that when comparing the possible
winning scenarios the agents are deciding over the same surplus difference. And
since losing the auction doesn’t provide any material cost to the agent (they “lose”
an item that was never theirs), the losing scenario also gives them the same null
gains.
After solving the problem for a single auction case scenario, the model was extended
for two sequential auctions (but could also be extended to N auctions) in order to
analyse the effects of choice between auctions. When considering multiple substitute
and sequential auctions, we were also able to achieve a closed form solution for the
optimal behaviour. In this case, we concluded that the last auction acts as a safety
net in case of not winning the item in previous attempts.
Throughout the auction, the agent’s expectations may be reviewed due to new infor-
mation or simply by watching the auction’s evolution. We show that, even though
the sequential auctions are linked, the competition through buy-out is independent
from one auction to another. In fact, the increase of competition in the last auction
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does not affect the previous auction’s optimal decision.
To accompany the mathematical results we provided numerical examples for each
model (for the single and sequential auctions case scenarios), as well as examples
that illustrate the effects of a review of expectations.
Suggestions for future research
As usual, the model proposed in this dissertation presents some shortcomings and
limitations that could be addressed in future research:
• The constancy of φ and λ. These two parameters of the model could be defined
as functions of w, adding more interaction between bidding evolution and the
opportunity costs for the agent.
• w following a mean reversion process. Using other processes and adding un-
certainty to it may allow the model to replicate sniping or shill bidding, two
know types of bidder behaviour in online auctions.
• We assumed that when the agent wants to exercise the option he can do
so and wins the item with 100% probability (Assumption 1), therefore the
model doesn’t account for the possibility of two participants deciding to buy-
out at the same time. It’s not a very strong assumption, but if the option
gains weren’t certain there might have been some differences in the sequential
auction results.
Possible Extensions
There are some ideas that can result in extensions for this model:
• To extend the model in order to overcome the presented shortcomings, either
by dropping or updating some assumptions.
• The introduction of the seller’s perspective. The owner of the item that is
being sold in auction (the seller) has the objective of maximizing the price of
the item. But the only thing that he can define in the auction is the buy-out
price. So, by combining our model with an approach to the seller’s choice of
setting that price, one should be able to determine the “optimal buy-out price”
that maximizes the seller’s surplus and ensures that the buyer still makes his
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best choice by paying that price. Sequential auctions interaction could also be
addressed.
• Changing the type of option. As stated before, there isn’t only one type of
option in online auctions today. In this work, we approached the problem of
the permanent buy-out option, but the model could be extended for temporary
options. There two main types of temporary options, some that disappear once
the first bid is made, others after an unknown price has been reached. While
the first can be simply traduced in the choice between a normal purchased
at a fixed price, the second one resembles barrier options. This could be an
interesting path for future investigation on the matter.
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Appendix
A The Model for Single Auctions with monitoring costs
In this extension to the single auction model we will address the problem of existing
costs for the agent (in terms of welfare) for monitoring the evolution of the auction.
Taking equation 2.7 and adding an instantaneous loss of welfare (θ) we get:
∂Fθ(w)
∂w
η (w¯ − w)− λFθ(w)− θ = 0
The general solution is to this differential equation is:
Fθ(w) = − θ
λ
+ ((w − w¯)η)−ληCθ (A.1)
where Cθ is, once again, an arbitrary constant that needs to be determined.
The value function will have two branches, just like in the original model. The
continuation region is given by equation A.1 and, since the payoff of the option is
the same, the second region is given by:
Fθ(w) = w
B − φw
The boundary conditions are the same as before (equations 2.8 and 2.9), so the value
function can be determined as:
Fθ(w) =

1
λ
(
[(w − w¯)η]−λη φ
[
η[θ+λ(wB−w¯φ)]
(η+λ)φ
] η+λ
η − θ
)
, w > w∗θ
wB − φw , w ≤ w∗θ
where:
w∗θ =
θ + wBλ+ w¯ηφ
(η + λ)φ
Let’s produce an example to show the changes.
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Consider the parameters in Table 2.1 and θ = 0.1. The results are as follow:
Output Value
w∗ 2.05769
w∗θ 2.44231
Table A.1: Threshold Results with monitoring costs
F(w)
FΘ (w)w
*
wΘ
*
1 2 3 4 5
w
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
FHwL
(w decreases as the auction progresses)
Figure A.1: Option’s Value and Optimal Trigger
Notice that we can rearrange the threshold w∗θ in the following manner:
w∗θ =
θ + wBλ+ w¯ηφ
(η + λ)φ
=
wBλ+ w¯ηφ
(η + λ)φ
+
θ
(η + λ)φ
= w∗ +
θ
(η + λ)φ
Comparing the thresholds from the model with monitoring costs and the original
model we can conclude that the threshold for w∗θ is always higher than the one
for w∗, meaning that monitoring costs reduce option value and force the agent to
exercise the option sooner, which is also visible in the numerical example.
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B The Model for Sequential Auctions with large differences
in Buy-Out Prices
The goal of the sequential auctions model was to address the problem of similar
auctions happening one after the other, creating compound options.
The value function that we proposed was defined for the case of w∗2 < w∗1, which
should happen for “similar” auctions. The best suited situation for applying the se-
quential auctions model is one where the auctions have close buy-out prices for equal
items (while maintaining Assumption 9 , wB1 < wB2 ). But what if this doesn’t hap-
pen? Auctions happening one after another, for equal items, may have significantly
different buy-out prices, so how should the agent decide in those situations?
First we need to define which auctions should be approached with our original
sequential auctions model and which auctions need a different approach. Since the
model for sequential auctions should only be used in cases where w∗2 < w∗1, we will
make a division in two different groups: one where w∗2 < w∗1 and another where
w∗2 ≥ w∗1.
The condition w∗2 < w∗1 can be turned into:
w¯ +
(wB2 − wB1 )λ2
ηφ
<
wB1 λ1 + w¯ηφ
(η + λ1)φ
(
wB2 − wB1
)
<
ηλ1
(
wB1 − w¯φ
)
(η + λ1)λ2
So, for two auctions where
(
wB2 − wB1
)
<
ηλ1(wB1 −w¯φ)
(η+λ1)λ2
we should use the original
model in this dissertation. For every other case, the approach must be slightly
different, being the option value deduction based on w∗2 ≥ w∗1.
For the last auction, everything remains the same, changes will only occur in the
previous auction. The differential equation is exactly the same as equation 3.6:
dF2(w) =
∂F2(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w) + λ2 [F1(w)− F2(w)] = 0
But when exchanging F1(w) for its expression we don’t consider two branches. As
w∗2 ≥ w∗1, the agent will want to exercise the option in the first auction for a higher
level of w than he would in the last auction. So, either it’s not yet optimal to exercise
the option in the first auction and the agent waits, or it’s optimal to exercise and
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the agent exercises the option immediately. But, if it’s not yet optimal to exercise
the option in the first auction (w > w∗2), then if the option is lost (a competitor
exercises the option before w reaches w∗2), the last auction begins and the agent will
not exercise the option in the last auction until w reaches w∗1, since w∗2 ≥ w∗1. So,
F1(w) in the differential equation must always be a value in the continuation region
(w > w∗1) because if w has not yet reached w∗2 then it means that it hasn’t reached
w∗1 either.
When considering w > w∗2 ≥ w∗1 the value function is obtained in the following
manner:
−
∂F2(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w)− λ2F2(w)
λ2
= F1(w)
−
∂F2(w)
∂w
η(w¯ − w)− λ2F2(w)
λ2
=
[(w − w¯)η] −λ1η
[(
wB1 λ1+w¯ηφ
(η+λ1)φ
− w¯
)
η
] η+λ1
η
φ
λ1
For which the general solution is:
F2(w) = [(w − w¯)η] −
λ2
η
− [(w − w¯)η]
−λ1+λ2
η λ2φ
[
ηλ1(wB1 −w¯φ)
(η+λ1)φ
] η+λ1
η
λ1(λ1 − λ2) + C2

where C2 is a constant to be determined.
From here on the deduction is simple, the boundary conditions are the same:
F2(w
∗
2) = w
B
2 − φw∗2
∂F2(w2)
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
w2=w∗2
= −φ
And the value function is given by:
F2(w) =

(w−w¯)ηφ
λ2
+
((w−w¯)η)−
λ1
η φ
(
ηλ1(w
B
1 −w¯φ)
(η+λ1)φ
) η+λ1
η
λ1
, w > w∗2
wB2 − φw , w ≤ w∗2
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Where w∗2 cannot be determined analytically, but can be achieved by using numerical
methods.
Consider the following numerical example:
Parameter Value Description
wB2 3.0 Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio in the first auction
(
PR
PB2
)
wB1 2.0 Buy Out Valuation-to-Price Ratio in the last auction
(
PR
PB1
)
w¯ 4.0 Expected Final Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
w - Valuation-to-Bid Ratio
η 0.30 Adjustment velocity in the mean-reverting process
λ2 0.35 Probability of a competitor’s Buy-Out in the first auction
λ1 0.45 Probability of a competitor’s Buy-Out in the last auction
φ 0.40 Probability of winning through bidding at the threshold w∗
Table B.1: Model Parameters
And the results are:
Output Value
w∗2 5.84466
w∗1 4.6
Table B.2: Threshold Results - Sequential Auctions
As expected, w∗2 > w∗1 which means that the agent prefers the first auction and will
fight for it even while knowing that there is another auction available for the same
item later on. The difference is that, this time, the second auction is very little
attractive because of the buy-out price difference.
Let’s just compare this first auction with an identical one but in the single auction
case-scenario. We’ll try to see if there is any effect in having a last auction available,
even if it’s so much less interesting than the first.
When considering a single auction with the same parameters the threshold is:
Output Value
w∗single 5.88462
Table B.3: Threshold Results - Single Auction
As one can see, w∗single is slightly higher than w∗2. There is some effect in the existence
of a second auction, it’s very small but there’s still postponing of the optimal moment
to exercise the option in the sequential auction case-scenario when compared to the
single auction result.
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The value function also has a small difference, being the sequential auction option
slightly more valuable than the single auction one (it’s barely visible, but the single
auction’s option value is the darker line):
w*single
w2
*
5.5 6.0 6.5
w
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F2HwL vs FsingleHwL
(w decreases as the auction progresses)
Figure B.1: Single vs Sequential Auctions
As expected, even in this extreme case-scenario, a free option still adds some value.
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